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INTRODUCTORY PROVISIONS
Those portions of Plaintiff-Petitioner's, Provo City Corporation's, ("Provo")
earlier brief which contain the Jurisdictional Statement, Issues Presented and Standards
for Review, Determinative Statutory Provisions, Statement of the Case and Statement of
Facts, need not be supplemented by this reply brief but are incorporated by this reference.
SUMMARY OF REPLY BRIEF ARGUMENTS
A limiting judicial construction of Utah Statute § 76-9-201 is possible, though not
necessary, because the term "harassment" has a plain legal meaning, particularly in
criminal statutes in which culpable intent is an element. Harassment is not protected
expression. Assuming for purposes of argument that § 76-9-201 needed a narrowing
statutory construction, such could be readily accomplished without violating either the
fundamental legislative purposes for or the constitutionality of the statute.
-1-

Since the Court of Appeals did not find § 76-9-201 unconstitutional in its entirely,
and since Mr. Thompson did not cross-appeal from the lower court ruling, he cannot now
take the inherently contradictory positions that the Court of Appeals decision should be
affirmed and that § 76-9-201 is facially overbroad in its totality.
REPLY ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THIS COURT CAN, BUT DOES NOT NEED TO, APPLY A NARROWING
CONSTRUCTION TO § 76-9-201 IN ORDER TO PRESERVE THAT STATUTE'S
VALIDITY AND CONSTITUTIONALITY. THIS IS SO BECAUSE CRIMINAL
M
HARASSMENT,fHAS CLEAR LEGAL MEANING AND IS NOT A FORM OF
CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED COMMUNICATION.
a) "Harassment" is a well defined term, and when used in a statute in which
criminal intent is an element, does not involve constitutionally protected speech.
In Mr. Thompson's brief he argues it is impossible for this Court to narrowly
construe § 76-9-201 in order to salvage its constitutionality. Respondent's Brief, p. 5.
Without citing legal authority in support of his position, he argues that ''harassment" as
used in the statute is "merely a persistent annoyance'1 and is essentially synonymous with
to "annoy." Respondent's Brief, p. 13. However, a major legal dictionary offers a much
clearer definition of the elements which constitute "harassment":
harassment. . . Words, conduct, or action (usu[ally] repeated
or persistent) that, being directed at a specific person, annoys, alarms, or
causes substantial emotional distress in that person and serves no legitimate
purpose. Black's Law Dictionary, 7th ed., (St. Paul: West, 1999)(emphasis
supplied). And see, State v. Schleiermacher, 924 S.W.2d 269, 275 (Mo. 1996)
(case applying and upholding Missouri statutory law).
-2-

In addition to § 76-9-201, at least two other Utah statutes describe criminal
harassment as an offense in which criminal intent is an element. § 76-5-106 (1) of the
Utah Code provides:
(1) A person is guilty of harassment if, with intent tofrightenor harass
another, he communicates a written or recorded threat to commit any violent
felony.
Similarly § 76-10-508 (2) (b) and (c) refers to criminal misconduct where:
(b) the actor with intent to intimidate or harass another or with
intent to damage a habitable structure . . . discharges a firearm in the
direction of any building; or
(c) The actor, with intent to intimidate or harass another, discharges
a firearm in the direction of any vehicle.
Harassment as defined by these Utah criminal statutes encompasses a term considerably
beyond the "slight annoyance for perfectly legitimate constitutionally protected purposes"
put forth by Mr. Thompson. Respondent's Brief, p. 12. Even in civil law, harassment is
described as conduct having an "improper purpose." URCP, Rule 11(b)(1).
The version of § 76-9-201 (1) in effect at the time of Mr. Thompson's conviction
provides that a person is guilty of telephone harassment: " . . . if with intent to annoy,
alarm ..., intimidate, offend, abuse, threaten, harass orfrighten. . . or recklessly creating
a risk thereof..." that person engages in various forms of conduct, one of which is to
make repeated calls after having been told not to call back. The present § 76-9-201(1)
deletes the language "or recklessly creating a risk thereof." But regardless of whether the
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present or precursor statute version is to be interpreted, other Utah harassment statutes
and the general tenor of § 76-9-201, make it clear that harassment in Utah is essentially a
crime grounded in intent. While Mr. Thompson may raise a defense of facial overbreadth
not just for himself, but for others who might be affected by the act, the trial transcript
discloses that the trial judge found Mr. Thompson's actions to be not just reckless, but
intentional and that the judge applied an intent standard to Thompson's actions::
[Judge Schofield]: . . . And I don't think there was any legitimate purpose.
I think the only clear evidence is that there was an intent to annoy. Particularly
after Ms. Thayer said don't call back, any subsequent calls had to have been
made with the intent to annoy or alarm or threaten or harass. R 45, p. 33.
Assuming for purposes of argument that old § 76-9-201(1) created alternative
liability for either intentional or reckless misbehavior, and assuming further that a
"recklessness" standard would somehow make §76-9-201 facially overbroad, the essence
of the statute can easily be salvaged by simply severing the language

lf

. . . or recklessly

creating a risk thereof as does the present act. The law is well-settled by both civil and
criminal decisions of this Court that where a statute can be preserved by removing an
offending part, a court should do so in order to save the remainder. In its opinion in State
v. Lopes, 980 P.2d 191 (Utah 1999) this Court struck down a portion of a statute, while
upholding the balance as constitutional. Lopes, supra 980 P.2d at 196. This Court noted:
. . . The general rule is "that statutes, where possible, are to be construed
so as to sustain their constitutionality. Accordingly, if a portion of the
statute might be saved by severing the part that is unconstitutional, such
should be done." Lopes, supra 980 P.2d at 196 (citing Celebrity Club, Inc, v.
-4-

Utah Liquor Control Commission, 657 P.2d 1292, 1299 (Utah 1982). And
see State v. Green, 793 P.2d 912, 917 (Utah App. 1990).
In determining whether part of a statute can remain after an unlawful segment has
been stricken, a court looks first to the legislative intent, if such is expressly stated, and if
not, to the language of the statute itself. Lopes, supra 980 P.2d at 196. Applying either
interpretative tool to the version of § 76-9-201(1) in effect at the time of Mr. Thompson's
conviction, it is evident that the statute subsection can easily be severed. A subsequent
legislature reenacted essentially the same subsection, preserving its basic purpose by
simply omitting the language about recklessness. And the words of the original statute
obviously juxtapose "intent" and "recklessness" in the alternative, strongly suggesting that
each term is separable and independent from the other.
Addressing the mental state required for an offense involving criminal intent,
§ 76-2-103(1) of the Utah Code indicates:
A person engages in conduct:
(l)Intentionally, or with intent . . . when it is his conscious
objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result.
The criminal intent (or even recklessness) standard relevant to § 76-9-20l(l)(b) telephone
harassment is something far removed from a legitimate telephone solicitation, the call of a
concerned mother or any of the other hypothetical situations posited in the Court of
Appeals opinion below. (Provo City v. Thompson, 2002 UTApp 63, ^ 18, 44 P.3d 828,
832-33). Mr. Thompson cites no case in which a mother has been prosecuted for trying to
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determine the status of a child, a consumer for calling a product customer service
department, or businessman seeking performance of an unfulfilled contractual term, nor
has Provo found any such case. None of the five examples cited in the Court of Appeals
decision demonstrates either a criminal intent or recklessness which could subject a caller
to prosecution for violating the earlier or the present telephone harassment act. To claim
that such kinds of conduct could result in criminal penalties under present or past acts is
"obscure" and "more fanciful than real." Slater v. Salt Lake City, 115 Utah 476, 494-95,
206 P.2d 153, 163 (Utah 1949). And see Members of the City Council of Los Angeles v.
Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 800 (including footnote 19)( 1984). It is noteworthy that while
§ 76-9-201 speaks only to the criminal intent of the caller\ the Court of Appeals decision
erroneously focused on the alleged annoyance to the call recipient). Thompson, supra
H 18, 44 P.3d at 833. Compare People v. Taravella, 350 N.W.2d 780 (Mich App. 1984)
where the Michigan Court of Appeals wrote:
. . . The statute clearly provides that the focus is on the caller; it is the
malicious intent with which the transmission is made that establishes the
criminality of the conduct, [citations omitted]. Thus, irrespective of the
listener's subjective perceptions, without the necessary intent on the part
of the caller, the use of obscene words alone would not fall within the
statutory proscription. Taravella, supra 350 N.W.2d at 784.
The Court of Appeals used a "conscious disregard" standard for the caller's
conduct (Thompson, supra 2002 UTApp 63, \ 18, 44 P. 3d at 833; And see Utah Code §
76-2-103(3)), while telephone harassment is essentially an intentional crime in which the
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actor intends to "engage in the conduct or cause the result." Utah Code §§ 76-2-103(1)
and 76-9-201(1). See State v. Vigil 842 P.2d 843 (Utah 1992) where this Court noted:
. . . Section 76-2-103(1) of the Code states that a person engages in
conduct intentionally . . . when it is his [or her] conscious objective or
desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result, (citations omitted).
Normally, we presume that when the legislature defines a term of art and
later uses that term in the same body of statutes, it intends a consistent
meaning, (citation omitted). Accordingly, the word "intent". . . should
be read to mean "conscious objective or desire." This meaning of the word
"intent" obviously is distinguishable from knowledge of the proscribed
conduct or result, which is the mental state required for depraved indifference
homicide. Vigil, supra 842 P.2d at 847.
In striking parts of § 76-9-20 l(l)(b) the Court of Appeals wrongly looked to the
impact on the caller rather than on the intent of the speaker and applied a "conscious
disregard" standard instead of the criminal intent language which provides the actual
standard contained in Utah Code § 76-9-201.
b) The Utah telephone harassment statute is susceptible to a narrowing
construction which removes any question as to its constitutionality. Both the title of
a statute and the common usage of its key words may be properly used to resolve
any doubts about the meaning of a statute's terms.
In the landmark decision Broadrickv. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973), the United
States Supreme Court indicated that the overbreadth doctrine should generally not be
invoked when a limiting construction to the statute may legitimately be applied. In its
opinion, the Broadrick Court noted:
. . . Application of the overbreadth doctrine . . . is, manifestly, strong
medicine. It has been employed by the Court sparingly and only as a last
resort. Facial overbreadth has not been invoked when a limiting construction
-7-

has been or could be placed on the challenged statute, (citations omitted).
Equally important, overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have been curtailed
when invoked against ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be applied to
protected conduct. Broadrick, supra 413 U.S. at 613.
In its decision in State v. Jordan, 665 P.2d 1280, 1283 (Utah 1983), this Court
cited with approval the above language of Broadrick and indicated that statutory overbreadth must be ,fsubstantialM before a statute will be invalidated on its face. This
Court further noted that unless a statute has a marked deterrent effect upon legitimate
expression and cannot be "readily subject to a narrowing construction" the overbreadth
doctrine should not be applied. Jordan, supra 665 P.2d at 1284. See also Erznoznik v.
Jacksonville, All U.S. 205, 216 (1975).
§ 76-9-201 is easily susceptible to a narrowing judicial construction. First, the
statute primarily applies to intentional misconduct which this Court has held must be a
"conscious objective or desire" to engage in harassing "conduct or [to] cause the result."
See Vigil, supra 842 P.2d at 847, Utah Code § 76-2-103(1). Courts in other jurisdictions
have held that a standard of criminal intent is an important factor in determining whether
a telephone harassment statute passes constitution muster. In State v. Alexander, 888
P.2d 175 (Wash. App. 1995), a case which upheld the validity of a municipal telephone
harassment ordinance, the Washington appellate court observed:
. . . [T]he specific intent requirement, which places the focus of the
statute on the caller, sufficiently narrows the scope of the proscribed
conduct. Alexander, supra 888 P.2d at 180. And see Thome v. Bailey,
846 F.2d 241, 243 (4th Cir. 1988) (". . . The requirement of a specific
-8-

intent to harass, clearly indicates what [misconduct] the West Virginia
legislature sought to criminalize. . . ."
Secondly, Utah statute § 76-9-201 is primarily directed at conduct, i.e. using the
telephone to harass, rather than to limit constitutionally protected speech. As the Utah
Court of Appeals noted in upholding an alleged overly broad stalking statute:
The facial overbreadth doctrine is a limited doctrine to begin with
and attenuates further as the prohibited behavior moves from pure speech
toward conduct that, even if expressive, may be properly restricted as a state
interest. Salt Lake City v. Lopez, 935 P.2d 1259, 1264 (Utah App. 1997).
Third, the legal definition of "harassment," includes the important element that the
offensive conduct "serves no legitimate purpose." Black's Law Dictionary, supra at 721.
Mr. Thompson argues in his brief that because a precursor of § 76-9-201 deleted the
words "without purpose of lawful communications," that a narrowing construction of the
present statute is not possible. Respondent's Brief, p. 15. However, he fails to indicate
that the deletion only applied to subsection (a) of the old statute, and not to the general
preamble of earlier section (1). See § 76-9-201(1993 ed.), attached as to this Reply
Memorandum as Exhibit "A." Since by definition "harassment" includes the element of
"no legitimate purpose," to add such language to the present statute would simply be
redundant surplusage.
Fourth, if a statute's text is ambiguous as to its intended scope, the title may be
used to help resolve doubts about the perimeters of the enactment. In a recent decision
the United States Supreme Court referred to the maxim that:
-9-

. . . The title of a statute and the heading of a section are tools available
for the resolution of a doubt about the meaning of a statute. Porter v.
Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 527-28 (2002). See also Almendarez-Torres v.
United States, 523 U.S. 224, 234 (1998).
Utah Code § 76-9-201 is entitled "telephone harassment. As indicated earlier, the
word "harassment" has a clearly defined legal meaning. If there were any ambiguity of
the meaning of the words "annoy, alarm . . . intimidate, offend, abuse, threaten, harass
or frighten" within the body of the statute, the title offers sufficient direction of what
conduct is encompassed within the statute for a possible violation of the law. In
upholding a conviction under a telephone harassment statute similar in many respects to
Utah's, the Idaho Court of Appeals disposed of an argument that language in that state's
statute was so vague that a defendant could not understand what conduct it was that the
law prohibited:
. . . "Harass" and "offend" are words commonly employed in ordinary
conversation. Use of neither term would leave a person of normal
intelligence wondering at the meaning or searching for definition or clarification. These terms together with their companions "annoy, terrify,
threaten and intimidate," unambiguously describe the specific intent that
is an element of the crime defined by [the statute]. . . State v. Richards,
896 P.2d 357, 364-65 (Idaho App. 1995).
The terms used in Utah's telephone harassment have clear legal connotations..
However, if any narrowing construction of the act were needed such could easily be
accomplished by the statute's criminal intent requirement and by the title of the act
itself which plainly defines its general scope.
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c) Criminal harassment is not constitutionally protected free speech.
A number of appellate court decisions have held that harassment is not entitled to
the protections of First Amendment free speech. The Richards decision cited earlier,
contains the following languageProhibiting harassment is not prohibiting speech, because harassment
is not a protected speech. Harassment is not communication, although it
may take the form of speech. The statute prohibits only telephone calls made
with the intent to harass. Phone calls made with the intent to communicate
are not prohibited. Harassment, in this case, thus is not protected merely
because it is accomplished using a telephone. State v. Richards, supra 896 P.2d
at 362 (Idaho App. 1995). (citing Thome, supra 846 F.2d at 243, which in turn
cited State v. Thome, 333 S.E.2d 817, 819 (W. Va. 1985) cert, denied 474 U.S.
996 (1985). And see DeWillis v. Texas, 951 S.W.2d 212, 217 (Tex. App. 1997).
And in the State of Washington decision, State v. Dyson, 872 P.2d 1115 (Wash.
App. Div. 1994), a case involving that state's telephone harassment statute, the
Washington Court of Appeals (also citing the Thome decision) noted:
The government has a strong and legitimate interest in preventing
the harassment of individuals. The telephone, a device used primarily
for communication, presents to some people a unique instrument through
which to harass and abuse others. Because the telephone is normally
used for communication does not preclude its use in a harassing course
of conduct. Dyson, supra 872 P.2d at 1120 (citing Thome, supra 846
F.2d at 243).
One who uses the telephone with the criminal intent to harass, intimidate, threaten
or frighten another should not be entitled to the protection of the First Amendment.
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POINT II.
SINCE THE COURT OF APPEALS DECISION BELOW DID NOT RULE
THAT ALL OF § 76-9-201 WAS UNCONSTITUTIONAL, MR. THOMPSON MAY
NOT ASSERT THE CONFLICTING ARGUMENTS THAT THE APPELLATE
COURT DECISION SHOULD BE AFFIRMED, AND THAT § 76-9-201 IS VOID
IN ITS ENTIRETY BECAUSE OF FACIAL OVERBREADTH.
Provo contends that there is an inherent conflict in two separate arguments raised
by Mr. Thompson in his Respondent's Brief. In part of his brief, Mr. Thompson argues
that the Court of Appeals decision below should be affirmed (Respondent's Brief, pp. 5,
16) and specifically acknowledges that the lower court found part of § 76-9-201(1 )(b) to
be constitutional (Respondent's Brief, pp. 1, 10). However, in other parts of his brief, he
appears to argue that all of § 76-9-201 was declared unconstitutional since the entire
statute allegedly suffers from facial overbreadth. (Respondent's Brief, pp. 5 . . .
"Because the statute is overbroad and unconstitutional it must be stricken down . . .,"
and 14 " . . 76-9-201 is not readily subject to a narrowing construction"). But Mr.
Thompson cannot have it both ways, particularly since he failed to file a cross-appeal
from the lower court decision.
The Court of Appeals specifically upheld part of § 76-9-201 (1) (b). Thompson,
supra 2002 UT App 63, ^ 24, 44 P.3d at 834 ( . . . "We see no substantial overbreadth in
the second part of subsection (b)'s prohibition.11). As subsection (a) was the subject of its
earlier decision in Provo City v. Whatcott (2000 UT App. 86, 1 P.3d 1113), the Court of
Appeals in Thompson saw " . . . n o need to revisit here the question of subsection (a)'s
-12-

constitutionality.11 Thompson, supra ^J 15, 44 P.3d at 832. The Court of Appeals declined
to address the constitutional validity of subsections (c) or (e) of § 76-9-201. Thompson,
supra % 15, 44 P.3d at 832. Whatcott is not before this Court on appeal. Mr. Thompson's
broad assertion that: "The Court of Appeals Correctly Ruled That Utah Code Ann. 76-9201 is Unconstitutionally Overbroad . . ." (Respondent's Brief, p. 5) is thus inaccurate.
The question of whether § 76-9-201 is unconstitutional in its entirety transcends issues
properly before this Court, especially when Mr. Thompson apparently seeks to affirm the
decision below.
CONCLUSION
That portion of the Court of Appeals decision which upheld the second part of
§ 76-9-20 l(l)(b) should be affirmed. This Court should overrule that portion of the lower
appellate court decision which found the rest of § 76-9-201 (1) (b) was facially overbroad
and, thus unconstitutional. The Court should also not permit Mr. Thompson to argue the
conflicting positions that the lower court decision should be affirmed while also asking
this Court to strike § 76-9-201 in its entirety.
DATED this 2</H day of April, 2003.

DXTrYM I"RICK"
' D i n i ^ " T>/°fcA/1XTT7V
VERNON
R O M N E y/
Deputy Provo City Attorney
Counsel for Plaintiff-Petitioner
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I certify that I hand delivered two true and correct copies of this Reply Brief to
Dana M Facemyer, Attorney at Law, 3610 North University Avenue, Suite 325-375,
Jamestown Courtyard, Cartier Building, Provo, Utah 84604, on April g f , 2003.
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ADDENDUM A
UTAH CODE, § 76-9-201 (1993 ed.).

76-9-201. Telephone harassment.
(1) A person is guilty of telephone harassment and
subject to prosecution in the jurisdiction where the
telephone call originated or was received if, with intent to annoy or alarm another, he:
(a) makes a telephone call, whether or not a
conversation ensues, without purpose of lawful
communication; or
(b) makes repeated telephone calls at extremely inconvenient hours or in offensively
coarse language; or
(c) insults, taunts, or challenges another in a
manner likely to provoke a violent or disorderly
response.
(2) A person is guilty of telephone harassment if by
making the telephone call he violates a protective
order issued pursuant to Subsection 30-6-6(2).
(3) Telephone h a r a s s m e n t
meanor.
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